Abstract.
INTRODUCTION
Tax planning is a business that is done taxpayer with the aim to reduce the number of tax burden so that the taxes paid will be lower. Minimizing the tax burden can be done in two ways, namely, from complying with the provisions of tax (legal) until the violation of the provisions of tax (illegal). According to some experts tax avoidance is an act to minimize the tax burden is still in the corridors of tax provision (legal), while in violation of tax provisions (illegal) is tax evasion. Sari (2014) described in legal tax avoidance was not prohibited, although often get the spotlight that is less good than the tax office as having a negative connotation. Tax avoidance activity of late is expected to be the important things that must be considered by the tax authorities. The practice of tax evasion may lead to tax evasion efforts, this will certainly have negative effects for the country, because if allowed to continuously will cause the state to suffer loss of tax revenue by a significant amount.
Bappenas (2005) stated that the tax evasion phenomenon in Indonesia, in 2005 there were 750 Foreign Investment Company (PMA), which is considered tax evasion by reporting the loss within 5 years in a row and did not pay taxes. Based on tax data conveyed by the Director General of Taxes in 2012 there were 4,000 foreign companies which reported nil tax value, the company is known to experience a loss of over 7 years in a row. While DJP (2013) mentions tax avoidance is generally performed by companies engaged in the manufacturing and processing of raw materials (Prakosa, 2014) . Maharani and Suardana (2014) explains that the number of companies that tax evasion prove that corporate governance is not yet fully done up by public companies in Indonesia. Corporate governance is an issue that never go out to continue to be studied businessmen, academics, policy makers, and others. An understanding of corporate governance practices continue to evolve over time.
Corporate governance is one interesting phenomenon to be studied in connection with the vigorous publicity about fraud as well as a business slump that occurred as a result of errors made by the executive management. Research related to tax avoidance has been widely implemented, such as is done by Annisa and Kurniasih (2012 ), Santoso (2014 ), and Fadhilah (2014 . Corporate governance is proxied by the quality of auditors, audit committees, institutional ownership, board of commissioners, and independent board while tax avoidance is peroxided by the book tax gap. The difference results of these studies to examine the motivation to develop research that has been done Fadhilah (2014) by adding managerial ownership as a proxy of corporate governance.
Based on this background, the research questions are: fisrt,is the institutional ownership has an effect on tax avoidance? Second,is the managerial ownership affect the tax avoidance? Third,is the independent board effect on tax avoidance? Fourth,is the audit committee influence on tax avoidance? Fifth,is the quality of audits affect the tax avoidance?
This study aims to determine the effect of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board, audit committee, the quality of audits of tax avoidance in the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Gap (BTG) must be positive, because companies with negative BTG are a company that does not tax avoidance. Based on these criteria the sample used is 10 companies.
Research Model
To test the hypothesis then created a model that describes the relationship between variables to be studied. Models were prepared using a multiple regression equation as follows: BTG = α + β1KI + β2KM + β3DKI + β4KA + β5AUDIT + ε
Where:
The model above is composed of: dependent variable that tax Avoidance, independent variables that institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board, audit committee, audit quality.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in this study is tax avoidance. The calculation of the variable tax avoidance has been widely used as a research study variables such as the Pohan (2008), Annisa and Kurniasih (2012) , Fadhilah (2014) , and Santoso (2014) using the formula: BTG = EBT-Taxable Income
Independent variables
Institutional Ownership (KI) is the number of shareholding by the institution. The indicator used to measure institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by the institution of the entire number of shares outstanding. This variable was used as the study variables by Pohan (2008), Annisa and Kurniasih (2012) and Fadhilah (2014) , using the formula: indicate that the presence of institutional ownership cannot be used as a monitoring tool in every decision taken by managers in order to support an optimal oversight of management performance. The results of this study support research and Kurniasih Annisa (2012) and Fadhilah (2014) which states that institutional ownership a positive effect on tax avoidance.
Effect of Managerial Ownership on Tax Avoidance
The second hypothesis states that managerial ownership negative effect on tax avoidance. The test results showed that the significant value of 0.000. Significant value less than 0.05 indicates that the second hypothesis which states that managerial ownership negative effect on tax avoidance accepted.
These results indicate that managerial ownership variable able to improve oversight of a more optimal and may influence the management in making tax avoidance policy.
The results are consistent with the results of research conducted by Pohan 
Effect of Independent Commissioner Board of the Tax Avoidance
The third hypothesis states that the independent board negative effect on tax avoidance. The test results showed that the significant value of 0.001. Significant value less than 0.05 indicates that the third hypothesis which states that the board of commissioners negatively affect tax avoidance accepted.
These results indicate that the proportion of independent board within companies to reduce tax evasion action, perhaps this is due to the greater or higher independent board, the more effective their performance in monitoring and controlling the performance of the directors or managers in the management of the company.
The results of this study contradict the results of research conducted by
Pohan (2008) who found that the independent board positive effect on tax evasion and support the results of research conducted by Annisa and Kurniasih (2012) Annisa and Kurniasih (2012) who found that audit quality has positive influence on tax evasion. However, these results support the research conducted by Fadhilah (2014) who found that audit quality negatively affects tax avoidance.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study concluded that institutional ownership has no effect on tax avoidance. Institutional ownership as a monitoring tool in any decision taken by the manager allegedly did not support an optimal oversight of management performance related to tax evasion. While managerial ownership has a negative effect on tax avoidance. It is presumed that managerial ownership can improve more optimal control and may affect the management not to commit tax evasion. Variable independent board is to have a negative effect on tax avoidance.
These results indicate that the proportion of independent board within the company could be expected to decrease tax avoidance, perhaps this is due to the greater or high commissioner who came from outside the company more effectively their performance in monitoring and controlling management performance.
The audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance. These results indicate that the audit committee could be expected to decrease tax avoidance, with such a large or small number of audit committee is able to improve supervision of the management, so that no tax avoidance. Audit quality has an influence on tax avoidance. These results indicate that the use of audit services The
Big Four accounting firm that there is the possibility of management can reduce tax avoidance measures.
